The role of policy in the exercise of discretion: a comparative search for fairness by Jansen, Friso
657 
 
 
 
 
Revista Juris Poiesis, Rio de Janeiro. v. 23, n. 32, p. 657-661, 2020. ISSN 2448-0517. 
 
THE ROLE OF POLICY IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION:  
A COMPARATIVE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS 
 
 
Friso Jansen1 
Birmingham City University, United Kingdom 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The executive in implementing the wishes of parliament is often faced with a problem of 
allocation. How to distribute limited resources and exercise the discretion afforded to the 
executive in such a way that this is both procedurally and substantively fair? The answer lies 
in the formulation of a policy. Through clear and transparent procedures citizens would be 
treated equally, therefore delivering administrative justice. Different countries, however, seem 
to prioritize different conceptions of fairness and equality. While in English administrative law 
the focus is placed on the need for a scrutiny of the individual circumstances of a claimant to 
avoid fettering discretion in Dutch administrative law the stress is placed on the claimant to 
prove he should be treated differently to the standard case envisaged in a policy document. The 
question becomes whether on closer inspection these theoretical differences in approach reveal 
differences in practical application. This paper will try to answer some of these questions based 
on a comparative reading of law and jurisprudence from both countries.  
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2. Fettering Discretion: Restraining Decision-Makers Through Development of the Common 
Law. 3. Auer Deference: A Striking Absence. 4. The Exercise of Discretion: Is Achieving 
Fairness an Impossible Dream? 
 
 
1. POLICY RULES IN THE NETHERLANDS: THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ACT 
REVIEWED 
 
Exercise of discretion by an administrative decision-maker to award a permit, give a 
subsidy, award benefits etc. is in many cases restricted through three overlapping mechanisms: 
the existence of policy promulgated by the decision maker, the existence of policy rules 
(beleidsregels) that provide detail on how the decision maker will apply the policy and the 
general principles of good administration (algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur) that 
govern the exercise of discretion. The relationship between these three layers is complex and 
the way the judiciary evaluates the exercise of discretion is developing. The codification of 
policy rules in article 4:84 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet 
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Bestuursrecht) (GALA) has led to a large increase in their use. The GALA requires that a 
decision maker follows its policy rules in all cases, thereby treating everyone in accordance 
with the principle of equality—one of the general principles of good administration. However, 
if maintaining the policy rules in an individual case leads to consequences for the applicant that 
are disproportionate in relation to goals of the policy rules the decision maker must deviate 
from the policy rules.2 This is described as the inherent power to deviate (inherente 
afwijkingsbevoegdheid). The circumstances in which this deviation can occur are strictly 
prescribed; the applicant would need to make a very compelling case that his or her 
circumstances are exceptional. The courts give the decision maker a wide latitude in deciding 
whether a case is so exceptional as to warrant the use of the inherent power to deviate from the 
policy rules.3 Recently, however, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of 
State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) has been more exacting and 
required the decision-maker to give a detailed motivation about why they did not allow an 
exception, even though the case of the applicant was not one in which the policy rules 
envisaged the discretion to award a permit would be exercised.4 
This increasing intensity of judicial scrutiny is interesting, and shows a shift in the 
appreciation of the role of the various powers in the trias politica. Traditionally the judiciary 
would be wary of encroaching upon the exercise of executive discretion, fearing that in this 
way they would disrupt the democratic process.5 The idea of Wednesbury Unreasonableness 
is comparable albeit not identical. 
Over the years this traditional idea was replaced by the notion that the legislator was 
leaving more and more powers to the discretion of the executive, thereby reducing the political 
legitimacy of the decisions of the executive. In addition, the increasing number of decisions 
taken by the executive, a result of the increasing reach of the welfare state, meant that fewer 
and fewer decisions were subject to direct or indirect democratic control. In addition the 
legislator required the administrative judges to do more to make sure that disputes would be 
definitely resolved, rather than referring the decision back to the executive.6 The outcome of 
these various political and societal developments is that administrative judges strive to provide 
 
2 Art. 4.84 section 3 GALA.  
3 ECLI:NL:RVS:2000:AN6745, Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Sept. 26, 2000). 
4 ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1314, Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (May 17, 2017) with annotation AB 
2017/270 H.E. Broring. 
5 Rolf Ortlep & Wouter Zorg, Van Marginale Rechterlijke Toetsing naar Toetsing op Maat: Einde van een Geconditioneerde 
Respons? ARS AEQUI 20 (2018). 
6 The so called ‘new case approach.’ See further, A.T. MARSEILLE et al., DE PRAKTIJK VAN DE NIEUWE ZAAKSBEHANDELING IN 
HET BESTUURSRECHT (2015). 
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more support to citizens that challenge the exercise of discretion by decision-makers and more 
frequently than before try to encourage the executive to achieve substantive equality, by 
adequately considering all the individual circumstances of applicants. In this way, they push 
for decision-making that is more than mechanical application of policy rules but rather 
maatwerk, decisions that are made to fit each individual applicant.  
 
2. FETTERING DISCRETION: RESTRAINING DECISION-MAKERS THROUGH DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE COMMON LAW 
 
Fettering discretion would occur if a policy was inflexible and did not allow for 
exceptions in the exercise of discretion by an administrative decision-maker. Such a policy 
would be unlawful as the individual circumstances of an applicant could not be taken into 
account. Where in the Netherlands the GALA always allows decision-makers to depart from 
their policy rules if the circumstances warrant it, common law requires that decision maker 
states this explicitly in the policy to avoid a charge of fettering discretion.7 At first sight this 
might seem to imply that English administrative law values flexible decision-making that is 
tailored to individual circumstances of all applicants as fair, closely connected to the underlying 
principle of substantive equality of applicants. This would stretch the role of fettering discretion 
too far. Instead in English administrative law the legal certainty that the enactment of a policy 
brings and the consistent application of policy are equally prized as important elements of the 
rule of law.8 This tension between consistency to allow for legal certainty, and specificity to 
individual circumstances to achieve fairness is a known tension in public law. The way in which 
the courts try to balance these two aims is through requiring the decision-maker to have a good 
reason for departing from the policy.9 The quality of the reasons for departure, and here a 
closely parallel lies with the Dutch experience, is the main focus of judicial control. 
The conceptual tree English judges use to justify a development of a ground of judicial 
review is of course the rule of law. A similar tendency can be observed in that the judiciary 
increasingly intensifies scrutiny by requiring the decision-maker to provide more compelling 
reasons, more extensive factual support, or a combination of these before certifying a decision 
as lawful.  
3. AUER DEFERENCE: A STRIKING ABSENCE  
 
 
7 R. v. Hampshire CC ex p. W [1994] E.L.R. 460. 
8 R. (Alvi) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKSC 33; R. v. Min. of Agric., Fisheries & Food, ex p. Hamble 
(Offshore) Fisheries Ltd. [1995] 2 All E.R. 714. 
9 R. (Munjaz) v. Mersey Care NHS Trust [2006] 2 A.C. 148. 
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An interesting aside is the striking contrast with the deference doctrines in the USA, 
where policy rules (regulations) that interpret the application of the law are shown deference 
by the court if the law is ambiguous and the interpretation by the executive in the regulation is 
not unreasonable.10 The reason that both England and The Netherlands do not know such a 
form of deference — policy rules that interpret the law do exist but they are not seen as in any 
way binding upon the court — is likely partly due to the different position of the executive. In 
the USA however, through the president the executive has direct democratic legitimacy, and 
through confirmation by the senate of key positions in the bureaucracy there is added 
democratic legitimacy for decision-makers. 
 
4. THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION: IS ACHIEVING FAIRNESS AN IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 
 
Both England and the Netherlands try to achieve the goal of fairness in tying the 
exercise of discretion by administrative decision-makers to the rule of law and allowing judicial 
scrutiny of their exercise. Starting from two very different historical starting points it becomes 
clear that the solutions to the problem of the tension between the general interest and the 
interests of the individual are strikingly similar. In both traditions increased judicial scrutiny 
has run parallel with a decrease in democratic legitimacy of the executive, compelling a need 
to protect the citizen against an overbearing state. The line between a valid rejection of a citizen 
as not falling within the rules and an oppressive decision that arbitrarily and therefore 
unlawfully withholds a benefit is one that is drawn over and over again. Recent jurisprudence 
shows that, against a backdrop of increasing Europeanisation, the free room for the executive 
to strike a bargain between the various interests at stake has been eroded. Deference to the 
executive has not disappeared but the executive faces increasingly critical scrutiny. 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
GALA - General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht) 
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